Време: Разлика между версии

[[Хронометър]]ът е вид часовник, предназначен за измерване на кратки периоди от време с много голяма точност. Името му идва от гръцката митология, по-точно богът на времето [[Хронос]]. Най-напред се използва при морската навигация и се нарича морски хронометър. С него се определя географската дължина с помощта на звездната навигация. [[Джон Харисън]] е първият, който постига желаната прецизност с тези уреди.

 

 

Днес, също така [[Глобална система за позициониране|Глобалната система за позициониране]] в съответствие с [[NTP]] (''Network Time Protocol'') може да бъде използвана за синхронизиране на всички системи, свързани с времето.

{{cite web |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4766842.stm |title=Fastest view of molecular motion |publisher=BBC News |date=2006-03-04}}

</ref><ref>

</ref>

 

|work=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

|quote=Newton did not regard space and time as genuine substances (as are, paradigmatically, bodies and minds), but rather as real entities with their own manner of existence as necessitated by God's existence... To paraphrase: Absolute, true, and mathematical time, from its own nature, passes equably without relation the [sic~to] anything external, and thus without reference to any change or way of measuring of time (e.g., the hour, day, month, or year).

</ref><ref>

{{cite encyclopedia

|editor=Edward N. Zalta

|quote=The opposing view, normally referred to either as „Platonism with Respect to Time“ or as „Absolutism with Respect to Time,“ has been defended by Plato, Newton, and others. On this view, time is like an empty container into which events may be placed; but it is a container that exists independently of whether or not anything is placed in it.

</ref>

 

|work=The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

|quote=First of all, Leibniz finds the idea that space and time might be substances or substance-like absurd (see, for example, „Correspondence with Clarke,“ Leibniz's Fourth Paper, §8ff). In short, an empty space would be a substance with no properties; it will be a substance that even God cannot modify or destroy.... That is, space and time are internal or intrinsic features of the complete concepts of things, not extrinsic.... Leibniz's view has two major implications. First, there is no absolute location in either space or time; location is always the situation of an object or event relative to other objects and events. Second, space and time are not in themselves real (that is, not substances). Space and time are, rather, ideal. Space and time are just metaphysically illegitimate ways of perceiving certain virtual relations between substances. They are phenomena or, strictly speaking, illusions (although they are illusions that are well-founded upon the internal properties of substances).... It is sometimes convenient to think of space and time as something „out there,“ over and above the entities and their relations to each other, but this convenience must not be confused with reality. Space is nothing but the order of co-existent objects; time nothing but the order of successive events. This is usually called a relational theory of space and time.

</ref> и [[Имануел Кант]],<ref name="Mattey">{{cite web

|url=http://www-philosophy.ucdavis.edu/mattey/kant/TIMELEC.HTM

|first=G. J.: UC Davis

|quote=What is correct in the Leibnizian view was its anti-metaphysical stance. Space and time do not exist in and of themselves, but in some sense are the product of the way we represent things. The are ideal, though not in the sense in which Leibniz thought they are ideal (figments of the imagination). The ideality of space is its mind-dependence: it is only a condition of sensibility.... Kant concluded „absolute space is not an object of outer sensation; it is rather a fundamental concept which first of all makes possible all such outer sensation.“...Much of the argumentation pertaining to space is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to time, so I will not rehearse the arguments. As space is the form of outer intuition, so time is the form of inner intuition.... Kant claimed that time is real, it is „the real form of inner intuition.“

</ref><ref name="McCormick">{{cite web

|title=Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) Metaphysics: 4. Kant's Transcendental Idealism

|year=2006

|quote=Time, Kant argues, is also necessary as a form or condition of our intuitions of objects. The idea of time itself cannot be gathered from experience because succession and simultaneity of objects, the phenomena that would indicate the passage of time, would be impossible to represent if we did not already possess the capacity to represent objects in time.... Another way to put the point is to say that the fact that the mind of the knower makes the a priori contribution does not mean that space and time or the categories are mere figments of the imagination. Kant is an empirical realist about the world we experience; we can know objects as they appear to us. He gives a robust defense of science and the study of the natural world from his argument about the mind's role in making nature. All discursive, rational beings must conceive of the physical world as spatially and temporally unified, he argues.

</ref> заявява, че пространството и времето не съществуват сами по себе си, а са следствие от това как хората представят нещата, защото човек може да познае даден обект единствено по начина по който го възприема.